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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Priority No. 2
v.
TONY PEREZ,
Case No. 950333-CA
Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF APPEAL AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION
A jury convicted defendant of theft by receiving stolen property, a seconddegree felony, and driving while unlicensed, a class C misdemeanor (R. 129,
130). Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995), this Court has
original appellate jurisdiction.
ISSUES AND REVIEW STANDARDS
1.

Whether the evidence that defendant did not have a driver's license

is so "inconclusive or so inherently improbable" that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt? In evaluating an insufficiency of the evidence
claim, this Court looks at the evidence to determine whether it is so inconclusive
or inherently improbable that it could not support a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 19QT) In this

case, the State concedes that the record evidence is insufficient to support
defendant's misdemeanor conviction for driving while unlicensed.
2.

When the trial court sustained some objections to defendant's

testimony on hearsay grounds, but the testimony nevertheless came in without
objection later, was the trial court's conduct prejudicial, even if erroneous?
Whether testimony is inadmissible hearsay is a conclusion of law, which this
Court reviews for correctness. State v. Olsen. 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993).
An error is harmless if it is "sufficiently inconsequential that [the appellate court
can] conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings." State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993).
3.

Did the trial court properly instruct the jury regarding "possession of

property recently stolen" consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
in State v. Asay. 631 P.2d 861, 864 (Utah 1981). This Court reviews jury
instructions via a correction of error standard. State v. Brooks. 833 P.2d 362,
363 (Utah App. 1992).
4.

Whether the defendant has established a sufficient number of errors

in the trial that, "standing alone [are not] severe enough to warrant a new trial,
but when considered together . . . denied the defendant a fair trial." State v.
Young. 853 P.2d 327, 367 (Utah 1993). This doctrine does not entail a precise
2

standard of review. If cumulative error exists, it depends on finding numerous
individual errors, each of which may have different standard of review. QL State
v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993); State v. St.Clair. 282 P.2d 323
(Utah 1955); Gooden v. State. 617 P.2d 248, 250 (Okla.Crim.App. 1980).
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-202 (Supp. 1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1995)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
A jury convicted defendant of "theft by receiving stolen property," a
second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), and of
driving while unlicensed, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 53-3-202 (Supp. 1995) (R. 119-20). As a result of these convictions, the trial
court sentenced defendant to a three-month sentence for the misdemeanor and a
one-to-fifteen year sentence for the second-degree felony (R. 129-30). The
sentences will be served concurrently at the Utah State Prison (id.).

3

Statement of Facts
At 6:30 in the morning on February 4, 1995, Bennie Gonzales left his
home to start up his 1993 red Chevrolet Cavalier (R. 199). He left the car
outside his garage so it could warm up and went back inside to get ready for
work (isL). About ten minutes later, he walked out of his house, found his car
was gone, and saw broken glass on the driveway (R. 200). Mr. Gonzales
promptly reported the theft to the police fid.).
At approximately 2:00 that afternoon, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Kathy
Slagowski was driving her marked police car southbound on 1-15 when she saw a
red Chevrolet Cavalier passing by her at a slightly higher rate of speed (R. 206).
When she looked at the car, she thought she saw the passenger light up what
looked like a marijuana cigarette (R. 207). Trooper Slagowski positioned herself
behind the car, which pulled over to the emergency lane abruptly, even before
she had fully turned on her emergency lights (R. 207). Because she was
primarily concerned with the possible marijuana, she approached the passenger
side and asked the passenger, Jose Al Cantor1, to hand over the marijuana2 (R.

1

This name is spelled in different ways in the record and transcript. In the
transcript, "AT is not capitalized, but is capitalized in the written documents. Except for
direct quotesfromthe transcript, which use the lower case, the State will capitalize the name.
2

No marijuana was ever, in fact, found and it was not a part of this trial.
4

212). While looking in the car, she noticed an open beer bottle in the front
passenger side and one of the passengers in the back seat "slipping his hands in
his pockets" in a nervous manner (R. 214).
Despite her request, no one was able to produce identification (isL).
According to the trooper, "[t]he driver [the defendant] told me he didn't have his
driver's license with him, or didn't have one, I don't recall" (HL). Trooper
Slagowski asked the three individuals to stand by the guard rail while she radioed
for backup (idL).
While she was calling for backup, defendant and his passengers bolted
from the guard rail and ran across the six-lane freeway (R. 215). Trooper
Slagowski informed the dispatch office of the escape and two officers responded
(R. 216). The police eventually found defendant and his cohorts hiding in a tire
warehouse at approximately 4600 South and 150 West (R. 262). After his
apprehension, defendant gave conflicting stories to the police. First, he told
Trooper Dan Ferguson that he did not know the car was stolen because Al Cantor
had picked him up and that he ran because he "thought Jose must have had drugs
or guns" (R. 249-50). Defendant also initially told Trooper Ferguson that Al
Cantor was driving, but after Trooper Ferguson confronted him with Trooper
Slagowski's contrary claim, defendant admitted he was driving (R. 251).
5

Defendant also initially told Trooper Mike Cowdell that Al Cantor picked
him up in the car, but only 20 minutes later changed his story to say that they had
asked to borrow the car from the owner (R. 263). Even though the purported
owner told defendant "No, you can't take the car, because you can't drive,"
defendant admitted that he and his friends took it anyway (i$L). Defendant never
told Trooper Cowdell that he was driving only because Al Cantor was drunk (R.
272). Defendant did not tell Trooper Ferguson that he took over driving from Al
Cantor because Al Cantor was drunk, which was defendant's version at trial (R.
258 (Trooper's testimony) 293-94 (defendant's testimony)).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State concedes that the evidence regarding driving without a license is
legally insufficient to support his conviction for driving while unlicensed.
Therefore the class C misdemeanor should be vacated. Although a jury's verdict
is accorded great deference, the evidence here simply was too insignificant for
the inference of guilt to logically follow. The trooper's statement that she could
not recall whether defendant told her he did not have a license or did not have it
with him is inconclusive because both possibilities have a fifty percent chance of
being correct. The defendant's second statement that his friend would not him

6

borrow the car because he could not drive, does not sufficiently add to that
evidence.
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred when it sustained the State's
hearsay objections to certain questions and answers defendant gave during direct
examination. Defendant concedes, however, that the testimony eventually came
in without objection; thus, defendant was able to present the evidence to the jury.
Thus, since the jury actually had all the evidence before it, there is no reasonable
likelihood that, but for the trial court's conduct, a more favorable result would
have occurred.
The defendant's challenge to jury instruction 19 is mistaken because it
erroneously interprets its primary legal authority. The substance of the jury
instruction on "possession of property recently stolen" reflected exactly language
the Utah Supreme Court has previously approved, avoiding mandatory language
or the creation of an impermissible inference.
Finally, defendant's reliance on the cumulative error doctrine is
fundamentally incorrect. This doctrine relies on the existence of more than one
error in the trial proceeding. Here, there were no errors in the evidence
regarding the theft by receiving count; even if the hearsay objections were
improper, they were harmless errors and did not prejudice defendant's case.
7

Also, the error in convicting defendant of driving while unlicensed should not be
considered an "error" for purposes of defendant's conviction of theft by
receiving.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE CONCEDES THAT THE EVIDENCE
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S DRIVING WHILE
UNLICENSED WAS INSUFFICIENT BECAUSE IT
WAS INHERENTLY CONTRADICTORY AND
INCONCLUSIVE; THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S
THREE-MONTH SENTENCE FOR THE CLASS C
MISDEMEANOR SHOULD BE VACATED.

Defendant alleges that the State's evidence of his driving while unlicensed
is insufficient to support the guilty verdict. Brief of Defendant at 8-11. This
Court reviews insufficiency claims with a jaundiced eye, since the jury is
normally the final arbiter of the evidence. State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984
(Utah 1993). However, in unusual circumstances, a jury convicts a defendant
based on evidence that is "so inconclusive or inherently improbable that it could
not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." LL When this
happens, this Court should nullify the verdict and reverse the judgment. LL
The State produced two statements that formed the basis for the verdict of,
guilt for driving while unlicensed. While questioning the people in the car,
Trooper Slagowski asked for identification (R. 214). Although none of the
8

individuals had identification, Trooper Slagowski told of the following specific
exchange with defendant, who was driving: "The driver told me he didn't have
his driver's license with him, or didn't have one, I don't recall" (MJ. The
second statement also came from defendant, as recounted by Trooper Cowdell,
when he was explaining why his "friend" would not let him borrow the car: "He
[the defendant] said that this friend said, "No, you can't take the car, because
you can't drive"3 (R. 263).
Trooper Slagowski's admission that she did not recall whether defendant
said "he did not have a license" or "did not have a license with him" establishes
two distinct, and equally possible, alternatives: either defendant said he did not
have a license, in which case, he would be guilty of the charged crime, or he said
he merely did not have the license with him, in which case he would not be
guilty. The use of the "or" affords the incriminating statement only a fifty
percent chance of being the correct one. Without more, two reasonable
alternative hypotheses do not equal proof "beyond a reasonable doubt."4 Because
3

Defendant denied making this comment (R. 303).

4

The State does not intimate that two opposing statements necessarily present
reasonable alternative hypotheses. The jury has a right to believe, based on other
circumstances, such as credibility of the witnesses, that one of the statements was true beyond
a reasonable doubt. Here, no such possibility exists because the statements came from the
same witness and the record provides no record that lends more credence to one version than
the other.
9

of the presence of an equally possible alternative, the "inference of guilt does not
logically flow." Workman. 852 P.2d at 987. This concept was best expressed in
a jury instruction the Utah Supreme Court discussed in State v. King. 604 P.2d
923, 926 (Utah 1979):
To warrant you in convicting the defendant, the
evidence must to your minds exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the defendant.
That is to say, if after an entire consideration and
comparison of all the testimony in the case you can
reasonably explain the facts given in evidence on any
reasonable ground other than the guilt of the defendant,
you should acquit him.
The second statement, told by Trooper Cowdell, does not bridge this
inferential gap. It consists of defendant's assertion that his friend reminded him
"you can't take the car because you can't drive" (R. 263). Though potentially
supportive of the inference that defendant was unlicensed, this statement also
supports other, equally valid inferences, i.e., that defendant cannot drive because
his insurance has expired or an evaluative judgment that defendant is not a good
driver or is intoxicated, or that defendant could not drive because he did not have
his license with him. Again, while the State's hypothesis is not foreclosed by this
statement, the inference of guilt does not logically flow from it, even when added
to the first statement. Therefore, the evidence was too inconclusive to support

10

the guilty verdict to the misdemeanor driving while unlicensed charge, which,
therefore, should be vacated.
H.

ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
SUSTAINED THE STATE'S HEARSAY
OBJECTIONS TO THE QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS DEFENDANT GAVE, DEFENDANT
WAS ABLE TO PRESENT THE INFORMATION
TO THE JURY LATER WHEN THE HEARSAY
PROBLEM WAS AVOIDED; THEREFORE, THE
TRIAL COURT'S ACTIONS DID NOT
PREJUDICE DEFENDANT'S CASE.

Defendant's theory was that the passenger, Jose Al Cantor, stole the car,
picked up defendant, and failed to tell him that the car was stolen until the
incident at the guard rail with Trooper Slagowski (R. 330-338). Defendant
claims that the trial court's sustaining objections to several questions and answers
prevented him from fully developing this theory. Brief of Defendant at 13. He
specifically challenges the trial court's actions during the following four
colloquies.
Q [by defense counsel] Okay, who was driving?
A [by defendant] I didn't know at first. He called me over the
car, he said, "Tony, Tony."

11

MS. BYRNE:

Objection, Your Honor,

hearsay.
THE COURT:

The objection is sustained as to what

he said.
MR. YOUNGBERG: Okay, We're not offering
that for the truth of the matter asserted; just to
explain his actions.
THE COURT:

I don't know where it's going. Sol

haven't heard what he has said, nor do I know what
you're offering it for. But the objection is sustained.
Objection to hearsay.
(R. 289).
Q [by defense counsel] Did he represent that the car was his?
A [defendant] Yeah, he did.
MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

The Objection is sustained.

MS. BYRNE:

Hearsay.

THE COURT:

It's sustained and stricken.

Q [by Mr. Youngberg] Did he have the keys to the car?
12

A [defendant] He did have the keys.
Q

Did he give you any reason to think it was stolen?

A

None at all. He told me he bought the car.
MS. BYRNE:

Objection, hearsay.

THE COURT:

Sustained, Mr. Perez, don't tell us

what anybody else said.
THE WITNESS: All right.
(R. 292).
Q [by defense counsel] And why did you flee from the scene?
MR. YOUNGBERG:

Your Honor, I believe

this is going to call for a statement by the other
individual, however, we're not offering that to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, simply to
explain his actions in fleeing.
THE COURT:

Well, I haven't heard an objection as

to what — are you going to make one?
MS. BYRNE:

May we approach the bench, Your

Honor?
(Side bar conference held out of the hearing of the jury)
13

Q[by defense counsel] So there came a time when you took
off, right?
A [defendant]
Q

Yeah.

All right. Without going into what anybody told you,

did somebody say something that made you run?
A

Yeah.

Q

So why did you run, Tony?

A

Because he told me the car was stolen.

(R. 297-98)

MS. BYRNE:

Objection.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

(R. 299).
Defendant's apparent objective in these colloquies was to get across to the
jury the idea that defendant was under the reasonable impression that the car
belonged to Al Cantor. Whatever the merits of defendant's goal, the objected-to
questions and answers did ask for or give inadmissible hearsay. Nevertheless, as
defendant concedes in his brief, the "testimony he sought to elicit made it into the
record." Brief of Defendant at 14. Defendant and his attorney had this
exchange.
14

Q
So the bottom line is you ran because why, you
were scared?
A

No, because the car was stolen.

Q

When did you find out the car was stolen?

A

When they took us to the side of the road.

Q

And how did you find out the car was stolen?

A

From Mr. al Cantor.

Q
Up to that point did you know that the car was
stolen?
A

No.

Q
Did you have any - In your mind did you have any
reason to think that [the] car was stolen?
A
(R. 299).

No.5

These answers gave the jury the full flavor of the information

defendant tried to get out in the previous conversations, but that were stricken on
objection. Due to this final colloquy, the critical inquiry becomes whether the
defendant was harmed. To determine whether a potential error justifies reversal,

5

Comparing this unobjected-to exchange to the earlier colloquies best illustrates
the hearsay problems. Throughout the earlier discussions, defendant restated the words
uttered by Al Cantor. In this exchange, however, the defendant only recollected the substance
of the information that caused him to run and to believe the car was not stolen, not Al Cantor's
precise words.
15

a reviewing court looks at all the evidence to determine if, absent the error, there
was a "reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result." State v. Dunn. 850
P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993); State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah
1987). In Knight, the Utah Supreme Court gave more definition to the term
"reasonable likelihood" by tying it to an "erosion of confidence" standard.
Knight. 734 P.2d at 920. In other words, the evidence allegedly omitted would
have to be so important that its absence erodes confidence in the verdict.
However, the evidence did, in fact, come in through other questioning;
therefore, defendant's fails to show a reasonable likelihood of a different verdict.
The evidence defendant wanted to bring in, i.e., that he did not know the car was
stolen, was not omitted as a result of the trial court's hearsay rulings. He was
allowed to testify that he fled the scene because he heard from Al Cantor that the
car was stolen (R. 299). This was the essence of defendant's theory. To succeed
in his challenge, defendant would have to show that the manner by which it
eventually came in did not "cure" the previous defects. This defendant tries to
do, but his appellate claim that the jury must have disregarded the testimony
because of the court's previous rulings is mere speculation. When looked at in
the overall context of the trial, this case becomes similar to State v. Butler. 560
P.2d 1136, 1140 (Utah 1977) (Hall J., concurring), in which Justice Hall pointed
16

out that, because the court eventually allowed defendant to make a statement that
had previously been stricken on hearsay grounds, "the prior ruling prohibiting it,
if error at all, was harmless error, (emphasis in original).
m.

JURY INSTRUCTION 19 DOES NOT MIRROR
THE LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6402(1) (1995) AND DOES NOT CREATE AN
IMPERMISSIBLE PRESUMPTION; THEREFORE,
THE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT ERRONEOUS.

Defendant challenges jury instruction 19, which informed the jury that
possession of recently-stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, might allow
it to infer that the person "in possession of the stolen property stole the property
and knew that the property was stolen" (R. 98). Defendant claims that this
I

instruction violated the presumption of innocence and was specifically prohibited
in State v. Chambers. 709 P.2d 321, 327 (Utah 1985). However, defendant
reads too much into Chambers by failing to recognize the important differences
between this instruction and the one prohibited in Chambers. A side-by-side
comparison of the instructions illustrates the distinction and shows why jury
instruction 19 was properly given.
Jury Instruction 19

Chambers instruction

Possession of property recently
stolen, if not satisfactorily explained,
is ordinarily a circumstances
from

Possession of property recently
stolen, when no satisfactory
explanation of such possession is
17

which you may reasonably draw the
inference and find, in light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by
the evidence in the case, that the
person in possession of the stolen
property stole the property and knew
that the property was stolen.

made, shall be deemed prima facie
evidence that the person in possession
stole the property.
Chambers. 709 P.2d at 324.

Thus, if you find from the
evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt (1) that the defendant was in
possession of property, (2) that the
property was stolen, (3) that such
possession was not too remote in
point of time from the theft, and (4)
that no satisfactory explanation of
such possession has been given or
appears from the evidence, then you
may infer from those facts and find
that the defendant stole the property
and knew the property was stolen.
(R. 98).
Jury instruction 19 differs significantly from the Chambers instruction in
two vital particulars. First, jury instruction 19 is permissive, constantly using the
word "may"; whereas the instruction in Chambers uses the word shall. The
Chambers instruction also made possession "prima facie" evidence, in line with
the statutory presumption in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1) (1995)6. It was the
6

"Possession of property recently stolen when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole
the property."
18

directory nature of the instruction and the term "prima facie" that drew the
Chamber court's ire. fcL at 326-27.
Further, the Chambers court did not entirely prohibit the use of an
appropriate instruction, as its discussion of State v. Asay. 631 P.2d 861, 864
(Utah 1981) indicates. The Chambers court drew upon Asay to distinguish the
correct and incorrect types of jury instructions in stolen property cases. Whereas
the Chambers instruction failed because it used mandatory language and the term
"prima facie," the instruction given in Asay survived because it did not include
that prohibited term and used permissive language: "You are further instructed
that one who is found to be in possession of property recently stolen, may be
found to be the guilty person unless he gives a satisfactory explanation of his
possession thereof." Asay, 631 P.2d at 863. Instruction 19 tracks the permissive
language of Asay.
Thus, contrary to defendant's claim that the Chambers court prohibited
trial courts from giving any jury instruction relating to stolen property, Chambers
only prohibits instructions identical to the statutory language, i.e., using the
"shall" and "prima facie" standard. In Chambers, the Court stated that in Asay
it "upheld an instruction which, unlike the instant case, did not use the statutory
language." Chambers. 709 P.2d at 326. The Court made the same distinction in
19

State v. Smith. 726 P.2d 1232, 1234-36 (Utah 1986). In Smith, the trial court
had given an instruction that paralleled the statutory language with one important
change: the court made clear that it "meant only that (/"the jury found certain
facts that 'you may infer from those facts that the defendant committed the
theft."' 726 P.2d at 1234 (emphasis added). The supreme court upheld the
instruction because the trial court clarified the meaning of the statutory language
in a way that avoided the Chambers problem. LL
Jury instruction 19 is permissive and does not use the prohibited statutory
language. It directs the jury to look at all the evidence and circumstances before
inferring, merely by the fact of defendant's possession, that he stole the property
or knew it was stolen. In substance, jury instruction 19 is nearly identical to the
approved instruction given in Asay and is devoid of the prohibited statutory
language used in Chambers. For this reason, the instruction was proper.
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IV.

BECAUSE THE CUMULATIVE ERROR
DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE ONLY WHEN
THERE IS MORE THAN ONE ERROR, IT DOES
NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE AND DEFENDANT'S
FELONY CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE
REVERSED ON THAT GROUND.

By definition, the "cumulative error'' doctrine is a remedy designed to cure
more than one error, none of which singly warrant reversal but together
undermine the court's confidence that a fair trial occurred. State v. Dunn. 850
P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). This doctrine is inapplicable here because the
only error is the conviction for driving while unlicensed, which should not be
considered as an "error'' for purposes of the separate theft count. Even if the
Court finds additional error, in the striking of the allegedly hearsay comments, it
was not prejudicial. Compared to State v. St. Clair. 282 P.2d 323, 332 (Utah
1955), where the Court found "numerous irregularities'' to justify reversal via the
cumulative error doctrine, this case actually presents no irregularities prejudicial
to the result.7
Defendant presents a quandary for himself by alleging the prosecutor's closing
argument was improper. As admitted, defendant's trial counsel did not object to these
comments. Brief of Defendant at 24, n.3. His refusal to object probably stemmed from his
recognition that prosecutors, and defense counsel, have wide latitude to discuss the "evidence
and the inferences and deductions arising therefrom." State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275, 1284
(Utah 1989). If defendant believes trial counsel's failure to object was incorrect, then the
proper analytical framework is ineffective assistance of counsel, which he has not alleged on
appeal. Without such a claim, unpreserved error cannot serve as a predicate for cumulative
error.
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Thus, the cumulative doctrine does not apply here and is not a correct basis for
reversal.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction for driving while unlicensed should be vacated; his
conviction for theft by receiving should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
The State does not believe oral argument would enhance the Court's
decision making process because the facts and legal precepts are straightforward
and adequately presented in the briefs. Additionally, the State does not believe
publication would significantly further the development of the law or aid courts
or practitioners.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

day of iJebHiaFy" 1996.

JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM

A

1
53-3-202. Drivers must be licensed - Taxicab endorsement.
(1) A person may not drive a motor vehicle on a highway in this state unless the person is:
(a) licensed as a driver by the division under this chapter;
(b) driving an official United States Government class D motor vehicle with a valid United
States Government driver permit or license for that type of vehicle;
(c) driving a road roller, road machinery, or any farm tractor or implement of husbandry
temporarily drawn, moved, or propelled on the highways;
(d) a nonresident who is at least 16 years of age and younger than 18 years of age who has in
his immediate possession a valid license certificate issued to him in his home state or country
and is driving as a class D or M driver;
(e) a nonresident who is at least 18 years of age and who has in his immediate possession a
valid license certificate issued to him in his home state or country if driving in the class or
classes identified on the home state license certificate, except those persons referred to in Part 6
of this chapter;
(f) driving under a temporary learner permit, instruction permit, or practice permit in
accordance with Section 53-3-210 or 53A-13-208;
(g) driving with a temporary license certificate issued in accordance with Section 53-3-207;
or
(h) exempt under Title 41, Chapter 22, Off-highway Vehicles.
(2) A person may not drive or, while within the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle,
exercise any degree or form of physical control of a motor vehicle being towed by a motor
vehicle upon a highway unless the person:
(a) holds a valid license issued under this chapter for the type or class of motor vehicle being
towed; or
(b) is exempted under either Subsection (l)(b) or (l)(c).
(3) A person may not drive a motor vehicle as a taxicab on a highway of this state unless the
person has a taxicab endorsement issued by the division on his license certificate.

(c) 1953-1996 by The Michic Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.

1
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses.
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the
property.
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the property or service
stolen if another person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an
interest in property for purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the
repayment of a debt or obligation.
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim ofrightto the property or service involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over the
property or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service honestly believing that the
owner, if present, would have consented.

(c) 1953-1996 by The Michic Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.

1
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property - Duties of pawnbrokers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals,
sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from the owner,
knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the case of an actor
who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the receiving offense
charged;
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, acquires it for a
consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable value; or
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or person who has or
operates a business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, or an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives,
or obtains property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of the certificate next to
his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used
or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee, or representative of
a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be
presumed to have bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appearsfromthe evidence that the defendant
was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a
pawnbroker or person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the property
without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then the burden shall be upon
the defendant to show that the property bought, received, or obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as defined in
Section 76-10-901.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on the security of the
property;
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods.

(c) 1953-1996 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.

ADDENDUM

B

INSTRUCTION NO.
Possession

of

property

4

recently

stolen,

if

not

satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that
the 'person

in possession

of

the

stolen

property

stole

the

property and knew that the property was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt faj) that the defendant was in possession of property, (uh
that the property was stolen, (T^p that such possession was not
too remote in point of time from the theft, and

(4) that no

satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or
appears from the evidence, then you may infer from those facts
and find that the defendant stole the property and knew the
property was stolen.
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